No items found.
April 30, 2026
·
0
Minutes Read

Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack

Advisory
April 30, 2026
·
0
Minutes Read

Mini Shai Hulud Supply Chain Attack

Advisory
April 30, 2026
·
0
Minutes Read
Kudelski Security Team
Find out more
table of contents
Share on
Thank you! Your submission has been received!
Oops! Something went wrong while submitting the form.

Summary

A sophisticated supply chain attack, dubbed "Mini Shai Hulud," has been attributed to the threat actor group TeamPCP. This operation involves the compromise of SAP-related npm packages through the injection of malicious preinstall scripts. The attack aims to harvest developer and CI/CD secrets from platforms such as GitHub, npm, and major cloud providers, with exfiltration occurring via attacker-controlled GitHub repositories.

Affected Systems and/or Applications

The attack targets specific npm packages within the SAP ecosystem, including:

  • @cap-js/sqlite - v2.2.2
  • @cap-js/postgres - v2.2.2
  • @cap-js/db-service - v2.10.1
  • mbt - v1.2.48

These packages have been modified to include malicious preinstall scripts that execute during the npm install process.

Technical Details

The attack begins with the execution of a setup.mjs script, which downloads the Bun runtime and executes an obfuscated payload (execution.js). This payload acts as a credential stealer and propagation framework, targeting developer environments and CI/CD pipelines. It collects sensitive data, including:

  • GitHub tokens
  • npm credentials
  • Cloud secrets (AWS, Azure, GCP)
  • Kubernetes tokens
  • GitHub Actions secrets

Exfiltration is conducted via public GitHub repositories using encrypted payloads. The malware includes logic to propagate to additional repositories and package distributions. Notably, the operation employs a system check to terminate if the compromised machine is configured for the Russian language, ensuring no data is exfiltrated from Russian-speaking systems.

The attack also introduces browser credential theft capabilities, targeting multiple browsers such as Chrome, Safari, Edge, Brave, and Chromium.

Mitigation

Security teams should take the following steps to mitigate the impact of this attack:

  1. Identify Exposure: Search environments, lockfiles, artifact stores, and CI logs for affected package versions and malicious files (setup.mjs, execution.js).
  2. Rotate Credentials: If exposure is suspected, immediately rotate GitHub tokens, npm tokens, cloud credentials, Kubernetes tokens, and CI/CD secrets.
  3. Audit GitHub Activity: Look for suspicious commits, newly created repositories, or indicators such as the propagation keyword and unusual commit authors.
  4. Monitor for Indicators of Compromise (IoCs): Utilize the provided file hashes to detect compromised files within your environment.

Indicator of Compromise

Component File / Package File Size (bytes) SHA256 SHA1 MD5
Shared Dropper setup.mjs 4,549 4066781fa830224c8bbcc3aa005a396657f9c8f9016f9a64ad44a9d7f5f45e34 307d0fa7407d40e67d14e9d5a4c61ac5b4f20431 35baf8316645372eea40b91d48acb067
Execution Script execution.js (sqlite/postgres) 11,723,748 eb6eb4154b03ec73218727dc643d26f4e14dfda2438112926bb5daf37ae8bcdb ca4a5bb85778ffcd2153ace88fe2d882c8ceeb23 b523a69b27064d1715d1f0aaffcfae63
Execution Script execution.js (db-service) 11,729,871 6f933d00b7d05678eb43c90963a80b8947c4ae6830182f89df31da9f568fea95 bc95cc5dda788295aa0c9456791520599ef99526 6fb87d243b011b5445f379f80e1a6b4d
Execution Script execution.js (mbt) 11,678,349 80a3d2877813968ef847ae73b5eeeb70b9435254e74d7f07d8cf4057f0a710ac 6bc859aaee1f8885eec2a3016226e877e5adba08 45dc9c02f82b4370ca92785282d43a86
Tarball @cap-js/sqlite & @cap-js/postgres 3,409,213 1d9e4ece8e13c8eaf94cb858470d1bd8f81bb58f62583552303774fa1579edee e80824a19f48d778a746571bb15279b5679fd61c e32eaf0c3cde9616831a1e92d42b0058
Tarball @cap-js/db-service 3,395,651 a1da198bb4e883d077a0e13351bf2c3acdea10497152292e873d79d4f7420211 7b6a28e92149637e5d7c7f4a2d3e54acd507c929 8cd683f78735c9bfc32600c73d3d9abe
Tarball mbt 3,373,788 86282ebcd3bebf50f087f2c6b00c62caa667cdcb53558033d85acd39e3d88b41 0af7415d65753f6aede8c9c0f39be478666b9c12 04d8a99447b16f6839fff3b978f88d7e

What the Cyber Fusion Center is Doing

The Cyber Fusion Center (CFC) is actively monitoring the situation and will issue advisory updates as needed.

References

Related Post